Bloc de l'equip docent de l'assignatura HISTÒRIA POLÍTICA I SOCIAL CONTEMPORÀNIA, Facultat de Comunicació Blanquerna, Universitat Ramon Llull

dijous, 27 de setembre del 2012

WTO - World Trade Organization : Lamy suggests “essential principles” for reform of global governance


09/21/2012 | 07:28am US/Eastern


I would like to begin by thanking the Rajaratnam School of International Studies and in particular its Dean, Barry Desker, for the invitation extended to me to address the Singapore Global Dialogue.

In my intervention, I will discuss what I think is the key issue of our time: the proper governance of the common house of humanity. My view is that the question of governance cannot be dissociated from the deep changes in the global system of the recent past and the challenges of the near, and not so near, future. So, let me start from there.

Radical changes
In the last 20 years, we have witnessed two radical changes, with which we have not quite learnt to deal. The first is the rise of emerging economies and the second is the growth in interdependencies.

2011 marked the 20th consecutive year that exports of developing economies have grown faster than those of developed ones. The share of world trade of advanced economies fell from 75% in 1990 to just above 50% today. Inflows of foreign direct investments in developing countries have increased from 20 to 50% in the last decade only.

The shift in comparative advantage and economic weight that the world economy is facing today mirrors past experiences in the 19th and 20th centuries. But what is unique about the current transformation is the fast pace at which change is taking place and the immense number of people involved. China's economy, for instance, was less than 2% of the world economy 20 years ago. Today, it accounts for 10% (in current dollar terms) and, according to some projections, it is likely to more than double that in 20 years.

The rise of emerging economies was set in motion by the changes in technology, transportation costs and regulatory environment. This swing in economic power has profound geopolitical consequences that will hardly be reversed in the foreseeable future.

The second big change of the past few decades has been the dramatic increase in interdependencies. I use the plural because the growth of interdependency is not only an economic phenomenon, but it encompasses also relations in the social, environmental and technological sphere.

In the economic domain, increased interdependency has certainly been the by-product of the rise of trade and financial linkages. Globalization first de-nationalized consumption, allowing consumers to buy goods and services from places where they are produced more efficiently. More recently, we have also witnessed a new phenomenon: the de-nationalization of production. The advent of new technologies and reduced trade costs makes it feasible to separate stages of production geographically, leading to the formation of value chains that span across borders. World trade in parts and components of manufactured goods, a rough measure of the importance of cross-border value chains, has doubled between 2000 and 2010, rising from 1.4 to 2.7 trillion dollars.  But economics is hardly the only domain where interdependence across countries has increased.

Migration is a powerful vector of social interaction across diverse cultures. In the past ten years, the total number of international migrants has increased by over 40%, reaching 214 million people worldwide. This means that migrants today would constitute the 5th most populous country in the world.

With the advent of the ICT revolution, technical and managerial know-how have become more firm-specific and less nation-specific. This has led to an unprecedented surge in the international mobility of technical knowledge, the positive impact of which we still may not fully appreciate. But societies have also become more interdependent through "risk sharing" in areas such as health and the environment. Pollution and communicable diseases clearly know no national boundary as we saw with SARS or with the H1N1. The shift in economic power from the West to the Rest is also reshaping the geography of environmental degradation and gas emission.

Challenges and institutions
In light of these deep social, economic and technological changes, the policy and governance challenges that we face today are certainly more complex than they used to be.

We are all familiar with the issues that our societies will have to confront in the decades to come. There are five broad areas where action is needed:

First, in the social domain, key challenges include population growth in the South and ageing population in the North, management of growing migratory flows, rapid rates of urbanization in developing economies and the rising incidence of non-communicable and infectious diseases.

The second area concerns the tasks that we face in the economic sphere: achieving sustainable and balanced economic growth, addressing the rising inequality and unemployment that endanger social inclusion in both developing and advanced countries, and managing an increasingly interdependent global economy.

Third, and as history has taught us, environmental problems can lead to the collapse of civilizations. Climate change and biodiversity loss, food and water scarcity, energy security and the unequal distribution of resources will seriously test the peaceful co-existence, if not the very existence, of our societies.

Fourth, welcome developments in democracy, education and human rights but also more individualism, acquired rights and vested interests have complicated the task of coalescing constituencies and made more difficult the task of managing change. The sense of belonging is more diverse, free riding easier and solidarity more elusive.

Finally, science and technology can offer solutions to address many of the global challenges of our time. But they also bring new risks, such as the threat caused by nuclear proliferation, bioterrorism or cybercrime, as well as a complex array of ethical and legal questions such as those associated to genetic research. Many of these issues are not new. Climate change, for example, has been on the global agenda since the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. Disarmament negotiations have been dragging on for decades. The key question then is: why has so little political energy been spent to solve the critical and impending challenges of our future?

A first answer comes from a question that Dante asked in his Divine Comedy:

Now who art thou, that on the bench wouldst sit In judgment at a thousand miles away, With the short vision of a single span?[1]

Short-termism, as we would call today Dante's concept, is first of all an anthropological problem. Short-termism acts as a huge break to the exercise of leadership. But, I believe, it is the role of government to guide, to regulate and to educate. In a word, to correct the collective myopia that affects our societies. The failure to act is, at least in part, a failure of our institutions.

Short-termism, however, is not the only cause of inaction. Three other problems limit our collective ability to respond to the global challenges of our time.

First, the political structure that we have inherited, the Westphalian order, is based on the notion of full sovereignty of nation states. The inconsistency between the extent of interdependencies, on the one hand, and the fragmentation of the political structure, on the other, is often a cause of inefficient policy. The tragedy of this discord is that national governments find it (individually) rational to choose policies that, in the attempt to increase the welfare of their constituency, may actually reduce it. The temptation of protectionism is just one of the many examples of this self-destructive behaviour.

The second problem is what I call a "coherence gap". One often overlooked dimension of interdependency is the interdependency across issues. The increase in biofuel production to address energy security concerns was an important driver of the spike in food prices in 2008, because both biofuels and food competed for scarce land and water. Similarly, climate change will have a huge impact on migratory flows; while the inability to address inequalities in developing countries will continue to affect global imbalances. We need a holistic view, but this often collides with the purely sectoral nature of our international institutions.

The third problem is that, while new economic and political trends have emerged, the rules and institutions governing multilateral cooperation have not kept pace with these changes. In fact, we are to a large extent living on the global rules created in the 1990s, the last period of improvements in global governance. From climate change to trade negotiations, the difficulty in finding a new balance between advanced and emerging economies in a muted context has certainly played an important role in holding back meaningful progress.
Conclusion: a new model of governance

In concluding my talk, let me turn to the following question. If one looks at the reform of global governance from a practical perspective, what are the essential principles? I would point to six elements:

First, global actions require political will, clear projects and common institutions. But these three pillars can only be held together by a system of shared values: a sense of common purpose.

The second principle is multilateralism. A system based on the centrality of a single economic and political hegemon, or some form of directorate of two or three countries, is in contradiction with the emerging structure of economic power and the nature of interdependencies.

Third, public institutions can only be effective if they are articulated according to the basic principle of subsidiarity, which is the ideological basement of federalism. Policy should be allocated at the lowest level of government (national, regional or global) encompassing all benefits and costs.

The fourth element is policy coherence. This means to ensure that international institutions do not function as vertical silos in strict isolation from one another.

Fifth, commitments need to be enforceable. Global governance must be anchored in laws and regulations accompanied by mechanisms for their enforcement, including binding dispute settlements.

The final element is legitimacy. This means finding ways to give citizens greater ownership of common institutions and greater say in their direction. This also means we need to foster greater solidarity by nurturing a sense of global belonging built on a set of common values. This can only be constructed bottom up, starting from the local level and hence the importance of an active civil society.

Shared values, multilateralism, subsidiarity, coherence, enforceability, legitimacy: our task in the years to come is to re-invent a system of global governance founded on these elements.

Thank you for your attention.

dijous, 26 de gener del 2012

Obama's 4-Part Plan to Fix the United Nations

It's a dirty little secret among supporters of the United Nations: The closer you get to seeing how the sausage is actually made in Turtle Bay, the more you wonder whether the UN-bashers have a point. The entire system is in such dire need of an overhaul--from its encrusted bloc politics and rigid personnel policies to its bureaucratic waste and pockets of cronyism--that even the most dedicated multilateralist may begin to channel his inner John Bolton. The big difference, of course, is that committed multilateralists are dedicated to reforming and strengthening, rather than crippling and weakening, the world body. Speaking last Friday at the Council on Foreign Relations, Ambassador Joseph Torsella, the Obama administration's point man for UN management reform, explained what the United States is doing to shake up business as usual in New York. Its point of departure, as President Obama has stated, is that the United Nations is both "flawed" and "indispensable."

Let's start with the flawed part. As Torsella rightly noted, there are "at least two UNs," and neither presents a pretty picture. One is the global institution itself. This "UN" is composed of departments, programs and agencies that deliver many essential services like peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. But it is also plagued by outmoded management systems, too little transparency and accountability, and mind-boggling waste. The other "UN" is composed of 193 diverse and often fractious member states that too often treat the world body as a spoils system, cling to outdated blocs like the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) or the Group of 77, and play to the galleries with irresponsible behavior. And predictably, the two "UNs" tend to blame each other for their failures.



The United Nations is also trapped in the past, structured to address traditional dangers of inter-state war, rather than the transnational threats--like "proliferation, terrorism, degradation and disease"--that dominate today's global security agenda.

The administration's agenda for UN reform rests on "four pillars," Torsella explained: thrift, accountability, integrity, and excellence.

Torsella himself admitted that achieving all of them is not realistic, so it's important to prioritize among them. Restoring the UN's "integrity" should be job one. Nothing weakens the United Nations more than self-inflicted wounds to its reputation, whether it is electing Cuba to the Human Rights Council, or permitting North Korea to assume the chair of the UN Disarmament Commission. The administration is working hard to prevent the UN from being its own worst enemy, Torsella explained, including by "working overtime to keep the worst offenders off UN bodies," fighting for competitive elections (as opposed to regional rotations) for seats on UN bodies, and preventing countries under Security Council sanctions from assuming UN leadership roles. One of the administration's most promising ideas is forging a new "credibility caucus" in New York to establish "membership criteria" and "promote truly competitive elections" to the Human Rights Council.

Promoting "accountability" registers as a close second. Transparency at the United Nations remains appalling. This facilitates mismanagement and contributes to public mistrust worldwide. Under heavy pressure, UN member states agreed to create an Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), but funding and staffing remain inadequate, and the office is subject to political interference. To shed more light across the UN system, the Obama administration is pressing for a stronger OIOS, urging greater involvement by civil society watchdogs, and asking "UN funds and programs to post audits on the web, as UNICEF and UNDP recently pledged to do." As Torsella explains:

Websites like the U.S. government's recovery.gov, the UK's dfid.gov, and Kentucky's opendoor.gov make unprecedented amounts of information--about salaries, contracts and budgets--easily available to the public. We're going to ask the UN system to do the same.

Furthermore, some reasonably minor and feasible management reforms could drastically improve the UN's ability to deliver--and even deliver "excellence." Changing UN personnel rules would make it easier to hire qualified staff and eliminate under-performers. Second, consolidating the delivery of services by multiple UN agencies within target countries, under a strong UN resident coordinator system, would allow the UN to truly "deliver as one." And a third step would be strengthening the evaluation of UN development programs--taking a page from the World Bank and other institutions--by focusing on outcomes and impact, not simply inputs.

In a period of fiscal austerity, finally, the UN cannot be immune. Here's where "thrift" comes in. Over the last twenty years, the UN's regular, two-year budget (not counting peacekeeping or other missions) rose an average of 5 percent a year, far faster than inflation. But thanks to pressure by the United States and like-minded governments, Torsella noted proudly, UN member states had just voted for only the second budget reduction in the last fifty years (and the first since 1998), a 5 percent decline from $5.41 to $5.15 billion.

As Torsella reminded his CFR audience, the United States has a fundamental stake in a credible, effective, and legitimate United Nations.

"Because--at its best--the UN can help prevent conflict, keep the peace, isolate terrorists and criminals, go where nobody else will care for the neediest of the world, smooth the channels of global commerce, and promote universal values that Americans hold dear. That's why the United States led in creating the UN in 1945, and why we continue to lead in renewing the UN today."

The reform agenda Torsella described reflects this constructive legacy in being sober, reasoned, and balanced.

That's a far cry from what we've heard from the Republican presidential candidates. Like theircounterparts in the House, the GOP contenders have adopted a slash and burn approach to the world body. Newt Gingrich, this weekend's victor in South Carolina, last summer called for defunding the UN. (Prior to dropping out, Texas Governor Rick Perry advocated the same in a televised debate). Rick Santorum, who's taking his fight to Florida, has made halving U.S. funding for the UN part of his official platform. Mitt Romney, meanwhile, called recent UN work an "extraordinary failure," and endorsesJohn Bolton's proposal that the United States defund the Human Rights Council--despite recent U.S. progress in improving that body's functioning. The libertarian Ron Paul gets even spookier, describing the United Nations as a threat to American liberty. (In 1998, he even warned that it "would confiscate our guns" if it got the chance).

Whoever is elected in November must be careful not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Many of the reforms UN critics identify are needed not only in Geneva and New York, but also in Washington, DC--underscoring the foolishness of trashing a flawed but indispensable organization. Kudos to Ambassador Torsella for putting forth such an ambitious framework and for illuminating a viable path for UN reform.

This article originally appeared at CFR.org, an Atlantic partner site.

This article available online at:

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/obamas-4-part-plan-to-fix-the-united-nations/251890/

diumenge, 18 de desembre del 2011

Josep Fontana: "Alemanya ha aconseguit dominar de nou Europa"

El 20-N Josep Fontana va fer 80 anys. I el primer que diu quan ens rep a la Universitat Pompeu Fabra és que només n'hi queda un per poder donar classe, entre ironies sobre les seves neurones. Al legislador li convindria submergir-se en les gairebé mil pàgines, prescindint de les 200 de bibliografia, dePor el bien del imperio. Una historia del mundo desde 1945(Pasado & Presente). És una obra monumental. I segueix treballant-hi. La història continua.

ARIADNA TRILLAS | Actualitzada el 17/12/2011 00:00

La història és un seguit de guerres?

De temps de pau n'hi ha molt pocs. Se suposa que ara estem en pau, però hi ha un munt de guerres obertes. El món hauria de ser com somiaven els anarquistes, tothom feliç, però no hem trobat com fer-ho realitat. Perquè l'ésser humà està dominat per irracionalitats, prejudicis, pors.

La por és un gran fil conductor.

És un element clau que explica la història. Per exemple, la por que senten els que tenen alguna cosa dels que no tenen res, pensen que els assaltaran i els hi prendran. És facilíssim vendre por de l'okupa, del delinqüent, de l'aturat. El vot massiu del PP és això, el " Virgencita, que me quede como estoy ".

Hi ha dolents. Però hi ha bons?

La història no és de bons i dolents, te l'agafis pel costat que te l'agafis. Tots dos bàndols tenien bones intencions en certs aspectes, i tots dos feien servir mètodes que duen al desastre.

És un indignat superdocumentat?

Un indignat és algú que, de cop, descobreix que el món no és la situació feliç en què creia que vivia i s'indigna. Si ets lúcid, entens bé que el món no va bé i que cal pensar com millorar-lo. Jo m'he format amb Gramsci: el pessimisme de la intel·ligència i l'optimisme de la voluntat. L'acció col·lectiva és l'únic que canvia les coses.

Les desigualtats mai no havien estat tan grans. Hi ha massa inacció?

Ningú no sap ben bé com sortir de la crisi. L'esquerra està desconcertada. I una part majoritària es distingeix de la dreta per la retòrica i poc més. O bé hi ha joves que s'apunten a velles fórmules radicals impossibles d'imposar. Sempre es pot gastar una mica menys, però l'austeritat ens acabarà portant cap a la pobresa, el desemparament, l'extinció.

Ha quallat que calen sacrificis. Creu que expliquem bé la crisi?

S'ha imposat la visió del curt termini, que la crisi és temporal. Però ja des dels 70 s'estan activant mecanismes que estan fent créixer les desigualtats, amenacen els drets socials, redueixen els salaris reals i ens porten a acceptar que els recursos per fer front a l'endeutament dels estats surtin només de la gent amb menys capacitat i que a les persones amb més capacitat se'ls abaixin els impostos. Se suposa que aleshores destinaran els diners a promoure feina i progrés, però mai no ho han fet. La factura l'hem de pagar entre tots.

El 2008 es va perdre la gran ocasió? Greenspan va acceptar que anava errat: el sistema no s'autoregula.

Tot això també respon a la idea que la crisi era temporal. Calia véncer-la i després tot tornaria a ser normal. Però el procés en què s'inscriu la crisi es va iniciar als 70 amb Carter, el va continuar Reagan i després Clinton, amb l'abolició de la vella llei que des dels anys 30 impedia que els bancs de dipòsits especulessin amb els fons. També es va deixar en plena llibertat d'actuació els derivats. Es va permetre l'especulació.

Però el 2008 va ressuscitar Keynes, encara que només un any.

Els governs és cert que van mobilitzar molts diners, però la majoria van anar a salvar la banca, i pocs a estimular l'economia i a donar feina. Com diuen premis Nobel com Stiglitz o Krugman, l'important no és tant el deute com l'atur.

Estem en un terreny abonat per als totalitarismes o dic una tonteria?

No fan cap falta. Els totalitarismes sempre surten quan hi ha una amenaça revolucionària, davant la qual es respon amb mà dura, o amb mà dura i certa capacitat d'engrescament, com el feixisme.

Per què diu que la por a la revolució va desactivar-se el 1968?

Simplificant, el Maig del 68 va començar a mostrar els límits de la revolta. Es va veure que assaltar l'estat des dels carrers de París era impossible, els altres tenien policia i exèrcit. I a l'altre costat, igual: la Primavera de Praga es va esclafar, no es volien tolerar les llibertats. Però a partir dels 70 va quedar la llavor de la por. En la defensa dels drets dels consumidors, per exemple.

És cert que els militars dels EUA van voler fer servir la bomba nuclear?

Sí. En el moment de Kennedy i els míssils cubans. Kennedy va cometre molts errors, però per sort va fer la reflexió que no valia la pena provocar res que pogués costar 7.200 morts. Hi ha l'anècdota del militar que va dir que si en una guerra total quedessin dos americans i un rus ja haurien guanyat. Per sort, al món actual la capacitat dels militars per influir de manera decisiva en política ha minvat.

Una altra cosa bona, va: l'augment de la consciència pel canvi climàtic.

Els plantejaments ecològics són un fruit dels 60, com la situació de la dona en les societats occidentals, o els canvis en la discriminació racial. Però la consciència ecologista no serveix de res. Perquè no arriba a influir políticament. Miri el Canadà.

Parla de penetració del poder polític de l'empresa als EUA. I aquí?

Deunidó. Quin poder polític real té La Caixa a Catalunya?

Ni idea.

Doncs ha de reflexionar sobre La Caixa i la política catalana. De la seva capacitat de penetració n'estic bastant convençut. I li asseguro que mai no en sortirà cap anàlisi desfavorable. I no deu ser una excepció. I el BBVA? I el Santander?

I la penetració de la religió?

Eisenhower; Truman; Bush, que és un convers... El pes dels grups cristians més integristes ha tingut conseqüències sinistres als EUA. I ja veurem què ens passa a nosaltres, tot i que el PP, encara que hagi estat utilitzant la religió contra el PSOE, és massa intel·ligent per no deixar-se entabanar. El problema per a Rajoy és l'economia. Només pot escoltar instruccions de Berlín.

Alemanya mana molt.

Alemanya ha aconseguit dominar de nou Europa, s'assembla molt al que somniaven abans. Però en pagarem l'autèntica factura nosaltres.

Els EUA veien la mà de Moscou arreu. Error conscient o paranoia?

Es van negar a entendre els nacionalismes. Per exemple, que els nord-vietnamites poguessin ser nacionalistes. Veien Moscou movent-ho tot. Era un error. Tenien por del fantasma de l'altre costat, quan era més dèbil del que semblava. I els russos, igual. Quan a Reagan li van dir que els russos tenien por que els EUA els ataquessin, va respondre, sorprès: "Per què? Què tenen que ens pugui interessar?" L'altre error dels dos bàndols era la teoria del dòmino: no podem deixar que un país caigui, perquè corromprà la resta.

Àsia condemna Occident a l'ocàs?

A l'Àsia és on hi ha els motors del creixement econòmic mundial, però els del poder polític encara no hi són. Ara veiem un problema de rivalitat entre els EUA i la Xina pel control del Pacífic Sud que pot comportar seriosos problemes. Els EUA encara diuen: hi ha una zona potencialment molt rica en recursos naturals, que cal treure del seu abast. Queda molta història per escriure en el terreny de la Guerra Freda, que en aquest camp encara és tan viva com el 1950. Els americans tenen projectes militars sobre com fer una guerra per controlar què porten els vaixells, per aïllar la Xina!

Quants llibres ha llegit per fer el seu? 200 planes de bibliografia...

No ho sé, però el que és segur és que el que m'he hagut de gastar en llibres no ho compensaré mai amb els drets d'autor. He treballat amb un text escrit que anava millorant i allargant, i amb materials agrupats. I encara estic recollint material, com si l'hagués de tornar a escriure.

Què li agrada tant, de la història?

Amb Jaume Vicens Vives compartíem un lema, el tinc aquí penjat en un tros de carta: "La història serveix per entendre el món on vivim, i pots fer feina per al país treballant-la".

Quan es va desencantar del PSUC?

Vaig militar en un partit que tenia una capacitat popular extraordinària, que era capaç de fer moure la gent als barris, que els diumenges sortien a vendre la premsa. Era una cosa oberta. Després es va matar des de dalt. A partir d'un cert moment, vaig decidir que no estava disposat a sotmetre'm, que ningú controlés el que pogués opinar o pensar. Però tinc el cor a l'esquerra i la sang, roja. Seguiré votant a l'esquerra, o a la CUP si acaba tenint consciència col·lectiva per presentar-se arreu.

L'estat plurinacional que defensava ha fracassat...

Caldria fer una educació col·lectiva tan gran per vèncer els prejudicis que no veig com podríem fer-la. La dreta utilitza l'argument anticatalà perquè sap que és un argument eficaç. El que hi ha hagut ha estat un cert desplegament d'autonomisme administratiu, amb tolerància per a determinades coses però amb molt poca capacitat de comprensió.

L'alternativa és la independència?

Qui és independent, ara? Rajoy és gaire independent?

Hi ha estats, però.

Malauradament no és un objectiu a curt termini, entre altres coses perquè a Berlín tampoc no ens ho deixarien fer. La pròxima cosa que voldria fer és una reflexió sobre la identitat dels catalans. És un tema complicat i difícil.

http://www.ara.cat/ara_premium/ara_tu/JOSEP_FONTANA-Alemanya-aconseguit-dominar-Europa_0_610739013.html

divendres, 9 de desembre del 2011

RESEARCH METHODS FOR HISTORY


This is the first guide to the sources, techniques, and concepts needed for effective historical research studies.

Each chapter introduces a different research method. These range from the well established, such as archival research, to the less widely known, such as Geographical Information Systems, and recent trends, such as textual analysis and material culture studies. The contributors explain how each method can be applied to different historical subjects and periods.

Case studies range from life stories written and spoken by migrants and soldiers to the "second wave" of women's history, including examples from Eastern Europe.

The book covers 13 different methods spanning all periods, from the medieval to the modern.

Provides a lively critical survey of methods for historical research at all levels While historians have become increasingly sensitive to social and cultural theory since the 1980s, the actual methods by which research is carried out in History have been largely taken for granted. Research Methods for History encourages those researching the past to think creatively about the wide range of methods currently in use, to understand how these methods are used and what historical insights they can provide. The book covers sources and methods that are well-established in History, such as archival research, together with those that are less widely known. The themes of the different chapters have been selected to reflect recent trends in the subject. Even with more established methods, however, the aim is to present new insights and perspectives and to open researchers' minds to new methodological possibilities. Key features International scope Encourages methodological comparison across time-periods Encourages historians at all levels to think critically and creatively Transferable methodological skills useful for Geography, Archaeology and Cultural Studies

Table of Contents

Contents Acknowledgements 1. Introduction: Why Bother with Method? Simon Gunn and Lucy Faire Part 1: The Essentials 2. Working With/In the Archives Michelle T. King 3. Approaching Visual Materials Ludmilla Jordanova 4. Material Culture Alan Mayne 5. Landscape and Place Jo Guldi Part 2: Researching Individuals and Groups 6. Collective Biography Krista Cowman 7. Life Stories and Historical Analysis Alistair Thomson Part 3: Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis 8. GIS, Spatial Technologies and Digital Mapping Keith Lilley 9. Document to Database and Spreadsheet R.J. Morris Part 4: Deciphering Meanings 10. Reading Language as an Historical Source Julie-Marie Strange 11. Analysing Behaviour as Performance Simon Gunn Part 5: Rethinking Categories 12. Ethics and Historical Research William Gallois 13. Time, Temporality and History Prashant Kidambi Notes on Contributors Index

Simon Gunn is Professor of Urban History in the Centre for Urban History at the University of Leicester. He has taught and studied research methods in Historical Studies for a number of years. His publications include History and Cultural Theory (Longman, 2006) and The Public Culture of the Victorian Middle Class (MUP, 2000). He is joint editor of the Cambridge University Press journal, Urban History and co-editor with James Vernon of The Peculiarities of Liberal Modernity in Imperial Britain (University of California Press, 2010). Lucy Faire is Honorary Fellow in the Centre for Urban History at the University of Leicester. She specialises in the history of home and leisure. She is the co-author with Mark Jancovich of The Place of the Audience: Cultural Geographies of Film Consumption (BFI, 2003).

Paperback: 256 pages
  • Publisher: Edinburgh University Press (30 Nov 2011)
  • Language English
  • ISBN-10: 0748642048
  • ISBN-13: 978-0748642045


dissabte, 12 de novembre del 2011

Dealing with the enemy

History of diplomacy


Nov 12th 2011

George Kennan invented the American post-war policy of “containment” of the Soviet Union. His biography, 30 years in the making, fills in the detail


George F. Kennan: An American Life. By John Lewis Gaddis. Penguin Press; 784 pages; $39.95 and £30. Buy from Amazon.com, Amazon.co.uk

THREE decades ago George Kennan— former American ambassador to Moscow, multilingual diplomat and conceptualiser of “containment”, the heart of his country’s foreign policy towards the Soviet Union—agreed to allow an American cold-war historian, John Lewis Gaddis, to serve as his biographer. Kennan had decamped from public service to the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton more than 20 years earlier and was already 78 years old. When he began giving Mr Gaddis interviews and stacks of personal papers in 1981, their understanding was that the biography would appear in the presumably not-too-distant future after the elder man’s passing.

Decades of interviews later, Mr Gaddis, who is now 70, had become accustomed to his students “speculating sombrely about which of us might go first”. Even Kennan felt sorry for “poor John”; in 2003 he lamented the “serious burden” of his own “unnatural longevity”. It was only in 2005, when death finally claimed Kennan at the age of 101, that Mr Gaddis could begin thinking about publishing this long-awaited biography.

The extraordinary length of the book’s gestation meant that much changed between conception and publication. Had it appeared in the mid-1980s, the context would have been cold-war stalemate; in the early 1990s, celebration; a decade ago in 2001, concern about terrorism. Because “George F. Kennan: An American Life” finally arrives in the uneasy year of 2011, its context is economic misery and questions about the future of American dominance in international affairs.

Mr Gaddis is unequivocal on this topic. He told the New York Times in 2004 that “American imperial power…has been a remarkable force for good, for democracy, for prosperity.” He has also expressed his admiration for the former presidents, Ronald Reagan and George Bush junior, and their versions of “grand strategy”, a topic he now teaches at Yale University. All of these developments have naturally given rise to much speculation. Could Mr Gaddis, who admits that he speaks no foreign languages, get on top of the mountain of material and do credit to such an international polymath? Would his own views emerge along with Kennan’s? The 784-page answer to both these questions is yes.

Mr Gaddis has mastered the sources that came his way over the decades. The resulting biography is engaging and lucid. The first half of the book almost has the sweep of a novel. Readers join Kennan in Germany as the Nazis rise; in Norway in 1931 as the awkward young man meets the parents of his fiancée, to whom he would remain married for 73 years; in the Soviet Union in 1933 as he establishes the first American embassy; in Czechoslovakia as Adolf Hitler arrives and the world descends into another war; and back in Moscow again in 1945 when he receives skin-crawling personal compliments from Joseph Stalin on his Russian language skills. The chapter detailing Kennan’s breakthrough—achieved by redesigning American foreign policy at a stroke, via his 5,000-word “Long Telegram” from Moscow to Washington, DC, in 1946—is particularly gripping. As he himself put it: “My reputation was made. My voice now carried.”

Before this, Kennan was a promising young officer in the American foreign service; after it, he joined the top ranks of American strategists. His arguments convinced the Truman administration that efforts to continue wartime co-operation with Russia were fruitless. America should recognise the Soviet Union as a new kind of enemy, one seeking to destroy “our traditional way of life”. Rather than fighting a conventional war, America would need to contain Soviet hostility firmly and consistently over the long term. As America resisted Moscow more and more, Kennan felt it was crucial that his country maintain the “health and vigour of our own society” and not become a garrison state.

After the “Long Telegram”, Kennan returned to Washington and founded the State Department’s influential Policy Planning Staff. But, according to Mr Gaddis, his prestige had peaked by 1948. After that, Kennan became increasingly sidelined for opposing what he judged to be excessive militarisation of his containment strategy. Yet he continued to condemn overly militarised policies for the rest of his life.

Kennan took particular offence at the attitude of the Reagan administration, which he viewed as “simply childish, inexcusably childish, unworthy of people charged with the responsibility for conducting the affairs of a great power in an endangered world.” Nor did the end of the cold war change his mind. In 1992 Kennan made a point of stating that “nobody ‘won’ the cold war”. It had been a long, costly tragedy, “fuelled on both sides by unreal and exaggerated estimates of the intentions and strength of the other side.”

Mr Gaddis disagrees. He closes his study by condemning Kennan for having “blinded” himself to the fact that, in Mr Gaddis’s opinion, Reagan brought Kennan’s “strategy to its successful conclusion”. If Kennan were alive, he would probably still disagree, and not without reason. If the elder man’s concern for the costs of bellicose foreign policy, rather than the younger man’s enthusiasm for imperial exercise of American power, had dominated the last decade, it would have made for a sounder grand strategy. In ways that this biography seems not entirely to appreciate, Kennan’s far-sighted opposition to American over-militarisation makes his personal career history less gripping than his legacy.